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The  low  taxable  income  reported  by  foreign-controlled companies  in  the 
United States has recently attracted a great deal of attention. For instance, the 
abnormally low rate of return of foreign-controlled companies has fueled con- 
cern in Congress over U.S.  taxation of  these companies and, more specifi- 
cally, concern that foreign firms operating in the United States are able to 
escape U. S.  taxation. 
A glance at the aggregate data shows the reason for congressional concern 
over this issue. Table 7.1 shows that the ratio of taxable income to assets was 
only .58 for foreign-controlled companies, as compared with 2.14 for domes- 
tically controlled companies in 1987. Moreover, this differential persists when 
the data are separately presented for nonfinancial, manufacturing, and whole- 
sale industries and  when the ratios are recomputed uskg sales rather than 
assets as the scaling factor in the denominator. 
The low earnings and tax payments of  foreign-controlled firms can result 
from many factors, including transfer price manipulation, greater debt costs 
than their U.S. counterparts, various effects of mergers and acquisitions, start- 
up costs, fluctuations in exchange rates, and differences in the cost of capital. 
Before proceeding, we briefly examine how each of these factors might lower 
the rate of return of foreign-controlled corporations. 
Transfer pricing may be used to price goods, intangibles, and management 
services such that taxable income is shifted to a low-tax jurisdiction. The in- 
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centive for shifting income out of the United States depends in part on the tax 
system of  the home country. For example,  a clear incentive exists to shift 
income to a home country that has both a low  statutory tax rate and a tax 
exemption on foreign dividends.  However, the bilateral comparison between 
U.S. and home-country tax rates should not be overemphasized, because in- 
come can easily be shifted to some tax haven interposed between the two. 
Most industrialized countries do not have the strict antiabuse rules that are 
contained in U. S. law limiting the routing of sales or services income through 
a tax haven.2 
With the data that are available, it is difficult to identify transfer price dis- 
tortions directly. Part of the strategy of this paper is to evaluate the extent to 
which the foreign-domestic differential is attributable to other explanations. 
By controlling for other factors that contribute to the differential, we can set 
an upper bound on the significance of transfer price manipulation. It is also 
possible to look at indirect evidence of  earnings management, such as the 
distribution of  foreign-controlled companies’ profitability ratios. That is, do 
foreign returns concentrate around zero, or are the aggregate foreign results 
attributable to extreme losses by a limited number of companies? 
Higher debt costs are a second means by  which foreign-controlled compa- 
nies might achieve relatively low U.S. taxable income. This may reflect more 
debt from unrelated lenders. Large debt costs may also result from “earnings 
stripping,” in which large interest payments are made to related offshore com- 
panies. In either case, high debt costs will lead to low taxable income, be- 
cause interest expenses are deductible. 
Foreign direct investment in the United States in the form of  acquisitions 
can have a number of  accounting and tax consequences, which in turn af- 
fect the measured foreign rate of  return. This may be particularly relevant 
because the major source of new direct investment in the United States since 
at least the late 1970s has been acquisitions rather than greenfield start-~ps.~ 
One consequence is the straightforward increase in the book value of  assets, 
which lowers the measured ratio of taxable income to assets. A second con- 
sequence of asset revaluation is that a firm that maintains a given ratio of debt 
to assets will experience an increase in interest expenses, which in turn erodes 
the firm’s taxable income. Finally, an acquisition would often, particularly 
before 1987, lead to a step-up in basis and higher depreciation deductions, 
again leading to lower taxable income. 
1. The significance of the exemption is that foreign taxes paid are of no value as a credit against 
home-country taxes. There may be other aspects of home-country tax systems that are relevant. 
For example, countries with some form of corporate tax integration usually do not pass foreign 
tax credits through to the personal level. 
2. The recent Price Waterhouse (1991) study on U.S.  International Tax Policy outlines these 
differences between U.S. and foreign practice. 
3. See the annual articles in the Survey of  Currenr Business  on U.S. business enterprises ac- 
quired or established by foreign investors.  In  1989, for example, acquisitions accounted for 86 
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Foreign acquirers may also tend to buy relatively unprofitable U.S. compa- 
nies with the intention of making better use of the assets. This possibility is 
suggested by  the annual Department of  Commerce data on U.S. businesses 
acquired by  foreign investors, which give the income of the company in the 
year preceding the acquisition (presumably as reported by  the buyer). Even- 
tually, the assets acquired would be expected to become more productive. But 
the current average profitability of foreign-controlled companies may be tem- 
porarily reduced due to the significance of recent acquisitions. 
A fourth possible cause for the low observed return of foreign-controlled 
companies is start-up costs. These refer to the temporary up-front losses or 
low accounting profits arising from diseconomies of small scale, learning-by- 
doing activities in the firm’s early stages, investment in marketing and R&D, 
and so forth. As the previous discussion suggests, a similar unprofitable phase 
may take place in the case of acquisitions as well. These costs may be partic- 
ularly high for foreign firms that must get to know a market different from its 
home base. Because these are presumably temporary costs, one would expect 
them to diminish over time as a firm matures. 
A fifth possibility is that an unexpected fall in the dollar after 1984 raised 
costs and thereby lowered the rate of return of foreign-controlled companies. 
Although exchange rate changes could not be used to explain rates of return 
that are permanently below domestic rates of return, they may have significant 
temporary effects. Because foreign-controlled companies, in particular those 
in wholesaling, rely on imports more heavily than domestic companies do, an 
unexpected  drop  in  the  U.S.  dollar  will  increase relative costs  more  for 
foreign-controlled companies (see Graham and Krugman 1989, tab. 3.1). Ir- 
respective of  whether the foreign-controlled companies absorb the cost in- 
crease to maintain market share, as is sometimes alleged, or simply raise their 
prices with a resulting loss in sales, their rates of return would be expected to 
fall as a result. 
Finally, some claim that foreign companies have a lower cost of capital than 
U.S. companies. A lower cost of capital may cause foreign firms to accept a 
permanently lower rate of return. It may also lead them to prefer profit profiles 
in which initial returns are relatively low and grow over time. 
Many allegations have been made, but very little systematic evidence has 
been  presented to evaluate the causes of  the low rate of  return of  foreign- 
controlled corporations. This paper uses several firm-level data files to inves- 
tigate the issue. 
As we indicate in later sections, the results present a mixed picture. First, 
the profits of foreign manufacturing companies increase over time relative to 
U.S.  companies,  suggesting some type of  maturation process. Second, ex- 
change  rates  have  a  significant effect  on the  profits  of  foreign-controlled 
wholesaling companies. Third, the ratio of taxable income to assets is under- 
stated for foreign companies because of the asset revaluation in recently ac- 
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sales is distorted by differences in the role of outside purchases and of invest- 
ment income. These effects explain about half of the differential between the 
rates of  return of  foreign- and domestically controlled companies. This still 
leaves us with a significant difference that we are unable to explain by forces 
other than transfer pricing. Moreover, we find, even after accounting for these 
other factors, that foreign-controlled firms were more likely to maintain a rate 
of return close to zero over the 1980-87 period. 
We can also reject some other explanations of foreign companies’ low tax- 
able income. First, debt and earnings stripping do not seem to be important in 
explaining the low taxable income of foreign-controlled  companies. Second, 
U.S.  companies acquired by  foreigners seem to be similar in profitability to 
the average U. S. company prior to acquisition. Furthermore, cost-of-capital 
advantages do not seem to be important. For one thing, the parents of foreign- 
controlled companies are more profitable than comparable U.S. companies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.1 provides a 
brief discussion of our data sources and other issues that relate the data. Based 
on data from a cross section of firms in  1987, section 7.2 presents evidence 
on revaluation effects, debt and earnings stripping, and cross-country differ- 
ences. In section 7.3, we turn to the 1980-87 panel of firms to shed light on 
the importance of exchange rate and maturation effects. Section 7.4 contains 
a look at the distribution of foreign companies’ returns to determine whether 
it  is consistent with income shifting. Again using the  1980-87  panel, we 
gauge the propensity of foreign and domestic firms to persist in particular rate- 
of-return categories. Section 7.5 is an exploration of the relationship between 
foreign parent characteristics and their U.S. subsidiaries’ profitability, while 
in section 7.6 we compare the profitability of foreign targets before acquisi- 
tion with the profitability of  the average U.S. nonfinancial company. Finally, 
we summarize and conclude in section 7.7. 
7.1  Data Issues 
7.1.1  Description of Data 
As noted above, we use several firm-level data files to cast more light on 
the issue. The basis of  these data is information collected from IRS Form 
1120, the basic corporate tax form. Information from these forms is collected 
and edited by the Statistics of Income Division (SOI) of the Internal Revenue 
Service and is then provided to the Treasury Department. SO1 uses a stratified 
sampling procedure. The data include all companies reporting assets of  $50 
million or more, although a company with fewer assets may also be chosen 
with certainty if its “proceeds,” a measure of cash flow, are large enough. In 
addition, there is a sample of smaller firms. 
Form 1120 contains various useful variables, including a company’s year of 
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and balance sheet information. Of  particular importance for this study, the 
form indicates whether 50 percent or more of the voting stock of a corporation 
is owned by  foreigners and, if  so, requests the owner’s country. This infor- 
mation allows us to classify U.S. companies as either foreign or U.S. owned. 
Companies referred to as foreign controlled in our analysis are the ones that 
actually identified a specific foreign country. 
The data from these forms were used to construct two basic data sets, a 
cross section and a panel. The cross section was constructed using 1987 data 
and was formed by  first restricting the companies only to those in the corpo- 
rate files that had been sampled with a probability of one. It was further trun- 
cated by excluding all companies with assets less than $50 million. All com- 
panies in finance, insurance, or real estate were also eliminated. In addition, 
the analysis was restricted to consolidated returns  only. This left  approxi- 
mately 600 foreign-controlled companies and 4,000 domestically controlled 
companies. The foreign companies in the sample account for 68 percent of 
the total assets of nonfinancial foreign-controlled companies in 1987, and the 
domestic companies in the sample account for 72 percent of the total assets of 
domestic nonfinancial companies. 
The panel data set was constructed from the basic 1120 data for the years 
1980 to 1987. To be included in the panel data set, a company had to file the 
1120 tax form and be sampled by  SO1 every year from 1980 to 1987. This 
effectively limits the panel to firms with assets of $50 million or more each 
year. To increase the sample size, we included in the panel nonconsolidated 
as well as consolidated firms. The panel data set includes about 1,300 domes- 
tically controlled firms and 110 foreign-controlled firms. Although the panel 
has many fewer companies than the full 1987 cross section, it is valuable in 
identifying the role of start-up costs and exchange rates. 
In  addition,  we  used  two  other  data  sets.  The  first of  these  links  291 
foreign-controlled companies on the 1987 data files with information on their 
parents. The parent corporation was obtained from the International Directory 
of  Corporate Afiliations and Who Owns  Whom; financial and tax information 
for the parent was obtained from Moody’s International. Finally, we used a 
sample of foreign acquisitions linked with Compustat financial information to 
study the preacquisition profitability of the target companies. In all cases, we 
focus only on nonfinancial companies in the United States. 
7.1.2  Other Issues 
The principal measure that is used in this paper to compare the profitability 
of foreign-controlled and domestic companies is the ratio of taxable income 
(total income less total deductions on line 28 of  Form 1120) to total assets. 
Note that taxable income is before net operating loss (NOL) deductions due to 
carryforwards from earlier years and also before special deductions, mainly 
dividends-received deductions. The NOLs are excluded because we wish to 
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as dividends are concerned, the investment in the stock of  another company 
will be reflected in the assets in the denominator, so the income should not be 
excluded from the numerator. In any case, the data can be examined to see 
whether dividends are more important for domestic companies. 
Total assets, rather than sales, are used in the denominator because of the 
conceptual expectation that rates of return on assets, but not necessarily the 
ratio of income to sales, should be equalized. The assets reported on Form 
1120 are those used for financial reporting purposes, not tax basis. They are 
based on historical valuations. The relationship between the current market 
value of assets and their book value depends, in part, on the time pattern of 
the company’s investments. Probably more important is their involvement in 
mergers and acquisitions, because it is then that assets are likely to be adjusted 
to market value. Because of  these valuation problems, it will sometimes be 
convenient to use sales as an asset proxy. But when the taxable income to sales 
ratio is the profitability measure, it will be necessary to adjust for sources of 
systematic error such as the company’s degree of dependence on outside sup- 
pliers. 
In the analyses in the later sections, domestic companies are used as the 
natural control group. After all, the well-publicized difference between for- 
eign and domestic companies shown in table 7.1 is the starting point for the 
inquiry. Nevertheless, domestic companies may have some shortcomings as a 
control group, It might be claimed that the comparison is unfair to foreign- 
controlled companies because the intangibles developed by  U.S. companies 
will produce U.S. taxable income while intangibles created by  foreign par- 
ents, presumably by home-based R&D, will yield taxable income in the home 
country. We will be in a better position to deal with this issue at the end of the 
next section, where we will see that it is not likely to be quantitatively very 
significant. 
A number of alternative control groups might be considered. One sugges- 
tion is to restrict the comparison only to U.S.-controlled multinational com- 
panies on the grounds that they are more comparable to foreign-controlled 
multinationals. This greater comparability is not completely obvious, because 
U.S. domestic companies may be the frequent target of  foreign acquirers. 
Further, it might be argued that the taxable income reported by U.S. multina- 
tional companies is itself distorted because of the income they shift out of the 
United States. In any case, as described more fully below, the results are not 
changed significantly when U.S. multinational companies are used as a con- 
trol group. In general, the foreign differential is even larger because U.S. mul- 
tinational companies are somewhat more profitable than purely domestic com- 
panies. 
Some have suggested using foreign affiliates of U.S. companies as a control 
group because there may be something distinctive about being a company in 
a foreign location. That would result in a foreign differential much larger than 
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Table 7.1  Taxable Income as  a Percentage of Total Assets and Sales in Foreign- 
and U.S.-Controlled Companies (1987 aggregate data*) 
Taxable  Taxable 
Income/Assets  Income/Sales 
Foreign  U.S.  Foreign  U.S. 
All Industries  .58%  2.14%  .89%  4.37% 
Nonfinancial  1.01  3.79  1 .oo  3.51 
Manufacturing  1.60  4.94  2.39  4.21 
Wholesale trade  .68  3.24  .29  1.41 
Nore: Taxable income is total income less total deductions (line 28 on  Form 1120) before net 
operating loss and special deductions. Sales refer to gross receipts or sales (line  1 on the Form 
1120). Data  may  differ slightly from tables in  SO1 Bulletin  10 (Summer), 1990, because of 
differences in definitions. 
*Based on tabulations of 1987 corporate tax file. 
on foreign direct investment indicates that foreign affiliates’ pretax income 
was 8.76 percent of total assets, while their parents earned only 4.76 percent 
on total assets. But there are many problems with using U.S. affiliates.abroad. 
First, they do not mirror foreign companies in  the United States, which are 
much more likely to be the result of acquisitions than of start-ups. Second, it 
would be necessary to deal with the different economic environments and in- 
centives to shift income in each foreign location. Accordingly, we stick with 
all domestically controlled U. S . companies, including both multinational and 
strictly domestic companies, as the control group, both because the public 
controversy has started on that basis and because the alternatives seem less 
valid. We  will also report results when other control groups are used. 
7.2  Evidence from 1987 Corporate Cross Section 
We  begin by using the 1987 cross-section data to analyze five issues: start- 
up or acquisition effects, debt and earnings stripping, variations across foreign 
countries, the use of income over sales as a dependent variable, and the poten- 
tial use of various types of expenses as transfer pricing mechanisms. 
7.2.1  Start-up or Acquisition Effects 
The first column of  table 7.2 gives the benchmark first regression for the 
relationship between the ratio of taxable income and total assets, denoted by 
r,,  and dummies indicating industry and foreign-controlled status. The results 
mirror the aggregate data in table 7.1 and reveal a very large negative and 
statistically significant foreign effect of 3.57 percentage  point^.^ (The overall 
4.  In the  1987 sample, the  mean  r, for domestic companies  is 4.07, and  .87 for foreign- 
controlled companies. These are very close to the aggregate 3.79 and 1.01  for nonfinancial com- 
panies in table 7. I even though the 1987 sample means are unweighted and the sample is restricted 244  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
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*Regressions are unweighted; t-values in parentheses. 
mean of r, in the sample is 3.69 percent.) The importance of  other variables 
will be identified by the extent to which their inclusion reduces this foreign- 
domestic differential. 
The next column of  table 7.2 shows how the results change when dummy 
variables based on the company’s date of  incorporation are added. The age 
only to companies with assets in excess of  $50 million. As we  will see in comparing the ratio of 
taxable income to sales, table 7.1 understates the difference in sales margins because of the large 
number of small, low-margin domestic companies included in the aggregate data. 
Incidentally,  for companies in electronics, food, and  chemicals, both  the  specific-industry 
dummy and the manufacturing  dummy apply. The specific-industry coefficient, therefore, reflects 
the industry’s return net of the average manufacturing return. 245  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled Companies 
dummies are all significant, with the expected pattern of younger companies 
having lower profits,  and reduce the foreign effect by 25 percent.  Does the 
significant effect of age reflect the start-up costs of  new companies? This is 
unlikely because the average size of companies in the sample that were incor- 
porated in the past five years is very large, $919 million in total assets, which 
is not much smaller than the average of $1,046 million for all companies in 
the  sample.  Recently  incorporated  foreign-controlled  companies  average 
$662 million in total assets. 
Rather than start-up costs of newly established companies, the date of in- 
corporation  dummies appear to reflect  the  revaluation  of  assets  following 
mergers and acquisitions.  Although reincorporation  is not legally necessary 
as a result of a merger or acquisition,  it seems a common consequence.  As 
noted  in  the introduction, the revaluation of  assets after an acquisition can 
affect the measured ratio of taxable income to assets in several ways. One is 
simply the direct effect of increasing the denominator in the taxable income to 
asset ratio. Depreciation  expenses can also increase because of a step-up in 
basis (which has become more difficult after the Tax Reform Act of  1986). 
Finally, the value of assets interacts with leverage because, with a given debt- 
asset ratio, interest expenses rise as asset valuation increases. 
The significance of asset revaluations is confirmed by the next table, 7.3, 
which gives the correlation of other variables with the age variables. The first 
column of table 7.3 gives the regression results for companies’ debt-asset ratio 
on the  age and industry  variables. The sign and significance of the date of 
incorporation  variables suggest that acquisitions and not start-ups are being 
identified.  The next column is even more persuasive because it uses the ratio 
of intangible plus “other” assets to total assets as the dependent variable. If an 
acquiring company pays more for its target than the value of its tangible and 
financial assets, it would put the remainder, including goodwill, in this resid- 
ual category.  The age effect is highly significant and much larger for more 
recent dates of incorporation. Finally, as we will see later in this section when 
we  use  sales  in the denominator and purge  the  profitability  measure of  all 
revaluation  effects, profit margins are not significantly related to the date of 
incorporation. 
Returning  to table 7.2, we see that the regression in the third column in- 
cludes as independent variables the ratios of debt and intangible assets to total 
assets. They are introduced to identify the role of debt and asset revaluations 
more directly. They are each highly significant, particularly the debt-asset ra- 
tios, but the foreign effect is not greatly reduced. Overall, the age, debt, and 
intangible variables reduce the foreign effect by about 28 per~ent.~ 
5. When a separate r, regression is performed for foreign companies only, the coefficients are, 
in  general, similar to the pooled ones. In particular,  the coefficient for the debt-asset ratio is 
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Table 7.3  Debt and Intangible Assets versus Age (1987 cross section)* 
Intangible and Other 
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*t-values in parentheses. 
?The numerator includes intangible plus “other” assets reported in Schedule L on Form 1120. 
7.2.2  Debt and Earnings Stripping 
The first column of table 7.4, which gives the regression results when the 
debt-asset ratio is the dependent variable, shows why the inclusion of  debt- 
asset ratios in the earnings regression does not  affect the estimated foreign 
differential substantially. There is virtually no difference between foreign and 
domestic leverage ratios, holding age and  industry constant. In fact, even 
without adjustment for age and industry, the difference is small, with the av- 
erage foreign debt to asset ratio in the 1987 cross section about 3 percentage 
points greater than the overall sample mean of 66 percent. 
The next two columns of table 7.4 look further into the issue of  debt and 
earnings stripping. They use information on loans from shareholders reported 
on tax returns. (We should caution that some taxpayers may not specifically 
identify shareholder loans on  their tax return.) It is convenient to think of 247  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled Companies 
Table 7.4  Debt, Interest Costs, and Shareholder Loans (1987 cross section of 
nonfinancial corporations)* 
DebVAsset  DebUAsset  Interest Expense/ 








Transportation and utilities 
Age 1: 5 5 years 
Age 2: >5-510 
Age 3: >10-515 
Age 4: >  15-520 
Age 5: >20-530 
Loans from shareholders/ 
assets 
Loans from shareholders 
X  Foreign 
Debt-asset ratio 
























































-  ,256 
(- 2.01) 
,090 
-  .0074 
(- 5.37) 




-  ,0009 
( -  .66) 

























*t-values in parentheses. 
shareholder loans as having two effects. One, they may increase the overall 
level of  the company's  debt rather than  simply substituting for third-party 
debt. Second, for a given debt-asset ratio, loans from shareholders may pro- 
vide the opportunity for the company to make excessive interest payments to 
related parties offshore. 
The first effect is examined in column 2 of table 7.4. The results show that 
loans from foreign shareholders increase debt-asset ratios only modestly. In 
view of  both the coefficient for all shareholder loans and the coefficient for 
loans from foreign shareholders, a one dollar increase in loans from foreign 248  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
shareholders increases debt by  about 25 cents. Because the average foreign 
shareholder loan-asset ratio is only 3.7 percent, the overall effect is small. 
The third column of table 7.4 looks at the impact of  shareholder loans on 
interest payments as a percentage of total assets, holding the debt-asset ratio 
constant. It indicates that, if anything, loans from foreign shareholders reduce 
the ratio of interest payments to assets for a given debt-asset ratio. More im- 
portant, the coefficient of the foreign variable is negative and significant; for- 
eigners’ interest expense, holding the debt-asset ratio constant, is significantly 
lower than for domestic companies. The interest cost differential, in view of 
the average debt-asset ratio of about two-thirds, seems to be about fifty basis 
points. 
Summing up,  even though loans from shareholders may not be well re- 
ported on corporate tax returns, the similarity between foreign and domestic 
leverage ratios and foreign companies’ low interest costs suggest that debt and 
earnings stripping are not important in explaining the foreign differential. 
7.2.3 
To  this point, we have estimated a pooled foreign coefficient. In order to 
determine whether the pooling is supported or whether finer country charac- 
teristics are at work, we create country dummies for the twelve parent coun- 
tries with the most foreign affiliates in the United States. Table 7.5 modifies 
the basic taxable income to assets and debt to assets regressions by including 
parent country dummies instead of the general foreign dummy. The first col- 
umn indicates generally small differences in debt-asset ratios among the major 
investing countries, although the debt-asset ratio of Japanese-owned compa- 
nies is almost 10 percentage points higher than that of domestically controlled 
companies and the debt-asset ratio of companies whose parents are based in 
the Netherlands is 6 percentage points higher. 
In the regression reported in the second column of table 7.5, the debt-asset 
ratio is held constant. What stands out in the second column is the relative 
uniformity of the country profitability differentials where there are more than 
a small number of observations. The Japanese differential is by no means un- 
usual, being about the same as that of the United Kingdom and substantially 
smaller than that of West Germany. 
One question is whether the pattern of  country differentials is consistent 
with the differences that might be expected in countries’ cost of capital. There 
is continuing controversy about how to measure differences in the cost of cap- 
ital across countries (see Poterba  1991). A consistent set of  cost-of-capital 
estimates is also not available for the countries listed in table 7.5. Accord- 
ingly, we chose a simple indicator that suggests itself, namely the extent to 
which a country is a capital exporter. This is measured by  the size of  the 
country’s current account surplus in the balance of payments as a percentage 
of  gross domestic product (GDP). Countries presumably export capital be- 
cause they have lower returns at home than they can earn abroad on world 
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Debt/  Income1 
Assets  Assets 
Canada (75) 
Japan (86) 
United Kingdom (122) 
Netherlands Antilles (26) 
Netherlands (65) 









R2  adjusted 




-  .064 







-  ,075 
(-1.68) 
-  ,008 
(-.14) 











-  ,018 
(- 1.60) 
-  .025 
( -  2.32) 
-  ,026 
( -  2.85) 
-  ,038 
(-2.01) 
-  ,014 
(-1.18) 
-  .048 
(-3.15) 
-  ,027 
(-.a) 
-  ,031 
( -  1.40) 
-  .029 
(- 1.61) 
.019 
(.  62) 
-  .049 
(- 1.88) 
-  ,155 
(- 2.06) 
-  .024 
(-1.74) 
-  .149 
(- 26.8) 
,184 
~~~  ~ 
*Industry and age variables not displayed; r-values in parentheses under coefficients 
markets (assuming relatively  neutral  treatment for foreign and domestic in- 
come).  However, when the capital-exports variable is added instead of  the 
country dummies, it has no explanatory power. 
7.2.4  Ratio of Income to Sales as the Dependent Variable 
Up to this point, the basis for the comparison of foreign and domestic com- 
panies has been the ratio of  taxable income to assets,  I,. The age dummies 
were used to control for the revaluation of assets following acquisitions, but 
the date of incorporation is an imperfect acquisition measure. Some compa- 
nies reincorporated in recent years because certain states have advantages in 
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a reincorporation. Therefore, sales are convenient to use as an alternative de- 
nominator because they  are  free from  asset valuation problems. In  other 
words, sales may be a good proxy for the market value of assets. 
But, because of the effect of revaluations on taxable income, a simple ratio 
of  taxable income to sales is itself not free from the consequences of  asset 
revaluations after an acquisition. First, as noted earlier, interest expenses can 
increase with a given debt-asset ratio. Also, depreciation expenses can in- 
crease after acquisition because of the potential step-up in basis. Accordingly, 
we construct an adjusted sales margin in which interest expenses and depre- 
ciation are added to income. 
In a final sales margin variation, we attempt to get closer to an operating 
earning concept by  starting with the adjusted margin and taking out interest, 
dividends, and royalties received. The use of sales as a capital proxy presum- 
ably applies only to operating assets, not to financial investments. This oper- 
ating income adjustment might be particularly relevant for foreign dividends, 
which may be much more important for domestically controlled multination- 
als than for foreign companies. 
Table 7.6 presents results for each of the three sales margin concepts. There 
are two regressions for each margin. The first has just the foreign and industry 
variables. The second adds age, the debt-asset ratio, the ratio of purchases to 
total expenses, and the inverse of total assets as independent variables.6  The 
purchases to total expenses ratio is intended to control for the possibility, 
which in fact turns out to be true, that foreign-controlled  companies are more 
dependent on outside suppliers-that  is, they are less integrated than domes- 
tic companies. Foreign companies would then be expected to have lower profit 
margins because any sales level corresponds to a smaller amount of  capital 
investment. Finally, the inverse of total assets is used as a size variable. 
The results in table 7.6 reveal that there is still a large significant foreign 
differential even when all of the revaluation consequences of acquisitions are 
taken out of the comparison. When the adjusted margin, including deprecia- 
tion and interest expenses, is used, the foreign differential in the first regres- 
sion is 5.6 percentage points and highly significant. If anything, this differen- 
tial is greater than is apparent in the aggregate data in table 7.1, which may be 
distorted by  the presence of  a large number of  small, low-margin domestic 
companies. When the other variables are added, the foreign differential be- 
comes 5.0 percentage points, a reduction of about ll  percent. The reduction 
in the differential, using the pure profit margin (before adjustment), is much 
larger, about 30 percent, in part because of  the debt and age variables. But 
this result may be somewhat suspect because of the positive sign on the pur- 
chases variable. One notable feature of these results is that the age variables 
are small and insignificant when interest and depreciation expenses are added 
6. Purchases are taken from Schedule A on Form 1120, describing the components of costs of 
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Table 7.6  Sales Margins* 
Independent  Taxable  Adjusted  Operating 
Variable  Income/Sales  Income/Salest  Income/Sales$ 
Foreign  -  .043 
(- 5.02) 
Manufacturing  ,057 
(7.77) 
Wholesale  .036 
(3.67) 
Transportation  .008 
and utilities  (.86) 
Food  -  ,016 
(-1.15) 
Electronics  -  ,013 
(-1.08) 






Age  I: 5 5 
years 
Age 2: >5- 
510 
Age 3: >lCk 
515 
Age 4: >15- 
520 
Age 5: >2C- 
530 
R*  adjusted  ,002 








-  ,011 
(- .81) 






-  .223 
(- 21.97) 
-  1170 
(- 2.55) 
-  ,032 
(-4.33) 
-  ,020 
(-2.17) 
-  .023 
(- 2.15) 
-  ,006 
(- ,060) 
--  ,006 
(.  66) 
.047 
-  .056 
(-6.19) 
-  ,014 
(- 1.83) 




-  .026 
(- 1.74) 





-  ,050 
(-5.48) 
-  ,012 
(- 1.56) 




-  .012 
(- .79) 






-  ,091 
(-8.21) 
(5.57) 
















-  ,023 
( -  2.32) 
,109 
(1 1.21) 
-  ,021 
(- 7.47) 
-  ,024 




-  ,044 
(-5.06) 
,007 





-  ,010 
(-0.73) 




-  ,066 
(-6.06) 
-  .lo8 
(- 10.27) 
( -  3.87) 
-  .004 
-  1847 
(- .55) 
-  ,005 
(- .52) 
-  .018 
(- 1.59) 
-  .005 
(- .46) 
-  ,005 
(- .48) 
,080 
*t-values of the coefficients in parentheses. 
?Adjusted income is taxable income plus interest expense and depreciation deductions. 
$Operating income is adjusted income less dividends, royalties, and interest received. 
to the numerator,  in contrast to the unadjusted net income regressions, rein- 
forcing the view that the date of  incorporation variables reflect asset revalua- 
tion rather than operating start-up losses.’ 
In the final two regressions  in table 7.6, using  the ratio of  the operating 
income to sales as the dependent variable, the foreign differential is reduced 
slightly. It is 5.1 percent with the industry dummies only, compared to 5.6 
7. It might be argued that start-ups have higher depreciation expenses, but the data indicate that 
the depreciation-sales  ratio is correlated with the age variables, although the depreciation-asset 
ratio is not, which is consistent with the asset valuation interpretation. 252  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
percent before the investment income is removed. This reduction is consistent 
with the difference between the two groups in the ratio of  aggregate invest- 
ment income to sales, which is 2.73 percent for domestic companies and 2.17 
percent for ones that are foreign controlled. The foreign effect falls to 4.4 
percent when the age, debt, and purchases variables are introduced. Combin- 
ing the adjustment both for investment income and for purchases and the other 
independent variables (i.e., going from the initial foreign effect of 5.6 percent 
for the adjusted margin to the 4.4 percent in the last column) achieves a reduc- 
tion in the foreign effect of about 22 percent. 
The size variable turns out to be significant in these profit margin regres- 
sions. A similar size variable, the inverse of sales, is sometimes significant in 
the taxable income to asset regressions. (The reason for the switch from assets 
to sales is to remove any  spurious correlation with the denominator in the 
dependent variable.) In neither case does its inclusion significantly alter the 
foreign effect. All the regressions in this section are unweighted. When the 
observations were weighted (by total wage costs), the results were not signif- 
icantly altered. The main effect of weighting was to remove some anomalies 
in the results,  such as the significant positive coefficient for the purchases 
variable in the unadjusted-margin regression. 
7.2.5  Expense Patterns 
The 1987 cross section can also be used to see whether foreign-controlled 
companies have a pattern of expenses different from that of domestic compa- 
nies and whether any difference is related to reported taxable income. This 
may provide evidence on the potential degree of transfer pricing abuses. The 
first issue is the dependence of the company on purchases from other firms. It 
might be expected that foreign companies that rely more on purchases have a 
greater opportunity to shift income abroad, because many of  these transac- 
tions could be with offshore related companies. Also, a higher ratio of pur- 
chases to total expenses may itself reflect excessive prices paid to affiliates. 
“Other” expenses,  which include royalty payments, management fees, and 
other overhead charges by  affiliated companies, are another interesting cate- 
gory. Accordingly, the regressions in table 7.7 include variables formed by 
interacting the foreign dummy with the ratio of  purchases to total expenses 
and the ratio of other expenses to total expenses. For each variable, there is 
both a taxable income to asset regression and an adjusted-margin regression. 
Columns 2 and 4 of table 7.7 do not reveal any consistent relationship be- 
tween foreign companies’ reliance on purchases and their profit margins or 
rates of return.  In the I, regression, the coefficient of  the interaction of  the 
foreign and purchases variables is basically zero. In the adjusted margin re- 
gression, the foreign purchases variable is positive and significant, not the 
pattern expected if there is income shifting.8 
8. The lack of significance of  the foreign purchases variable demonstrates that including the 
ratio of  purchases to total expenses in the regressions in table 7.7 did not “overadjust” for the 253  Low Taxable Income of Foreign-Controlled  Companies 















-  ,020  -  .027 
( -  3.25)  (-3.35) 
-.150  -  ,150 
(-27.2)  ( -27.1) 
,001 
(.33) 






,187  ,190 
Adjusted 
Income/Sales 
-  .010 
(- .79) 









-  .083 
(- .68) 





*Age and industry dummies not shown; t-values in parentheses 
Columns 1 and 3 of the table, which give the results for the ratio of “other” 
to total expenses, are more indicative of  the possibility of  income shifting. 
The interaction of the foreign and other-expenses variable is negative with 
borderline significance in the r,,  taxable income to asset regression, and again 
negative and highly significant in  the adjusted margin regression. Foreign 
companies do not on average have a higher share of other expenses than do- 
mestic companies, but the ones that do will have lower profit margins and 
rates of return. 
7.2.6  Foreign and Domestic Intangibles and Other Control Group Issues 
Finally, we can return to some of  the control group issues raised earlier. 
One is the possibility that a comparison of the U.S. profitability of foreign- 
controlled and domestic companies is intrinsically unfair because each com- 
pany’s intangibles tend to be developed in its home base. Thus, a U.S.-based 
company’s income will include a return on its intangibles, including income 
derived from exports and foreign operations (through royalties), whereas a 
foreign company will have to pay royalties back to its parents. This asymme- 
try in the source of intangibles does not, however, seem to be a significant 
factor in explaining the foreign differential. First, it applies only to start-ups, 
not to acquisitions of U.S. companies, which are a quantitatively much more 
significant vehicle for foreign ownership. Second, the foreign differential is 
difference between foreign and domestic companies. For it might be claimed that foreign compa- 
nies’ measured dependence on outside suppliers just reflects their overpaying for their materials. 
If  that were the case, one would expect a large negative coefficient for the foreign purchases 
variable in the profit margin equation because the purchases variable would indicate more than a 
simple adjustment for the capital actually used by the company. Similarly, the foreign purchase 
coefficient should be negative in the taxable income to assets regression. 254  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
not  larger  in  high-technology industries such as chemicals or electronics. 
Along the same lines, the foreign differential is not much affected when the 
ratio of R&D to assets or sales is added as an explanatory variable. In addi- 
tion, to the extent that foreign income and royalties bias any comparison of 
foreign and domestic companies, we have already abstracted from this effect 
in creating the operating earnings concept in table 7.6. Finally, nontax data on 
royalties published in the Survey of Current Business indicates that they do 
not significantly alter the profitability measures. U.S. parents received $7.0 
billion of  royalties in  1987, while U.S. affiliates of foreign companies paid 
$1 .O  billion to parents. If royalties received were taken out of domestic com- 
panies’ income and royalties paid were added back to foreign-controlled com- 
panies’ income, the average domestic-foreign income differential would be 
little affected. 
Earlier we also discussed the use of U.S  .-based multinational corporations 
(MNCs) as the control group rather than all U.S. companies. The extent to 
which the results are altered was examined either by adding an MNC dummy 
as another variable or by restricting the analysis only to MNCs and foreign- 
controlled companie~.~  We  added an MNC dummy variable to the profitability 
regression reported in the third column of table 7.2. Although the coefficient 
for the MNC variable is positive, it is small and insignificant. The MNC vari- 
able is larger and significant when only the foreign and industry dummies are 
included in a regression corresponding to the first column of  table 7.1. Ac- 
cordingly,  adding the age,  debt,  and  other variables explains a somewhat 
larger percentage of  the initial foreign-MNC differential, about 40  percent 
compared to the 28 percent referred to earlier. But the differential between 
foreign-controlled companies and MNCs is substantially larger to start with, 
so the unexplained differential is slightly larger. 
When sales margins are used as the profitability measure, as in table 7.6, 
the MNC dummy remains positive and significant for the taxable income mar- 
gin and the adjusted margin regressions even when other explanatory van- 
ables are included. This may reflect the larger foreign investment income of 
multinational corporations, because the MNC coefficient is much smaller and 
insignificant in the operating margin regression where investment income has 
been removed. Thus, apart from any asymmetry in the importance of foreign 
investment income when sales margins are used, using MNCs as the control 
group does not affect the results much. The unexplained foreign-domestic dif- 
ferential is generally slightly larger because of  the somewhat greater profit- 
ability of multinational companies. 
To  sum up the analysis of  the basic control group in section 7.2, adding 
explanatory variables such as the date of incorporation and the debt-asset ratio 
9. A U.S.-controlled  company was designated as an MNC if it received a foreign tax credit in 
excess of  $1 million or any gross-up credit for foreign dividends (indicating at least 10 percent 
ownership of  a foreign company) or had filed a Form 547 1, the information return for foreign- 
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reduces the foreign-domestic difference in profitability by  about 25 percent. 
The results are robust across countries and are not affected much by  using 
taxable income over sales rather than taxable income over assets as the depen- 
dent variable.  Further, expense patterns of  foreign- and domestically con- 
trolled companies do not by themselves indicate large transfer pricing prob- 
lems.’O Still, we are left without about 75 percent of  the initial difference in 
foreign and domestic returns to explain. 
7.3  Exchange Rate and lkend Effects in the Panel 
The 1980-87  panel is made up only of companies that filed a corporate tax 
return in each of  the eight years. Because no new entrants during the period 
are included, it can be used to identify any maturation or learning effects as 
foreign companies grow from start-up status or begin to benefit from the up- 
front investments in their acquisitions. This maturation effect might be ex- 
pected to be particularly notable in manufacturing because of the greater sig- 
nificance of economies of scale and investments in technology. 
The panel can also be used to identify any effects of exchange rates on the 
relative profitability of foreign-controlled companies. As noted in the intro- 
duction, because foreign-controlled companies use a disproportionate amount 
of  imported components, their profits relative to domestic companies may be 
affected by  fluctuations in the price of  the U.S. dollar. The year 1987 may 
therefore give an inaccurate picture of foreign companies because by then the 
U.S. dollar had fallen by about 30 percent in real terms from its peak in  1985. 
If there is an exchange rate effect on rates of return, it should be particularly 
visible in foreign-controlled wholesaling companies because they import pro- 
portionately much more than manufacturing and other companies. 
Any  relationship between the price of  the dollar and foreign-controlled 
companies’ rates of return need not necessarily reflect “pricing to market ,” or 
the attempt to maintain long-term market  share by  absorbing higher costs, 
Even in a conventional model, an increase in costs will reduce rates of return 
if the importer has made investments on the expectation of  lower costs and 
greater demand by  ultimate consumers. There may also be a very short run 
exchange rate effect to the extent that importers have trade credit extended to 
them by exporters denominated in foreign currency. In any case, the exchange 
rate effect should not last indefinitely, because in the long run the importer’s 
capital should adjust to any new, permanently lower price of the dollar. Still, 
these short-run effects may be important for an extended period of time. 
We  attempt to identify any trend or exchange rate effects in a pooled regres- 
10. As  we will discuss more fully in dealing with the distribution of returns, there may be no 
correlation between purchases and profitability, because the intrinsically more profitable compa- 
nies have more leeway in shifting profits from the United States. 
1 1. Lichtenberg and Siege1 (1987) found that total factor productivity in manufacturing plants 
tended to gradually improve after a change in ownership. 256  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
sion for 1980 through 1987. We  interact foreign manufacturing and foreign 
wholesaling dummies in turn with a time trend and with an index of the real 
value of the dollar published by the Federal Reserve Board. The exchange rate 
and trend variables each take on a single value in all observations in a given 
year. As always, domestic companies are included in the pooled regression. 
A separate dummy variable for each year is also included to reflect changes in 
business conditions and tax provisions. 
Table 7.8 presents regression results based on the panel. It indicates that the 
real price of the dollar has a highly significant effect on foreign wholesalers’ 
taxable income. Their profits go up when the real value of the dollar increases. 
The impact is also large quantitatively. For example, the Federal Reserve 
Board index for the real value of the dollar went from 132.0 in  1985 (and 
128.5 in 1984) to 90.6 in  1987, implying a decline of 4.7 percentage points 
in foreign wholesalers’ taxable income to asset ratio. The exchange rate coef- 
ficient for foreign-controlled manufacturers is also positive, but it is predict- 
ably much smaller than the wholesale coefficient and is statistically insignifi- 
cant. 
The interaction of  the time trend with the foreign manufacturing dummy 
indicates a highly significant positive-trend effect for foreign-controlled man- 
ufacturers. There is no comparable trend for U.S.-controlled companies over 
the period. (The foreign wholesaling trend coefficient is negative but statisti- 
cally insignificant and smaller in magnitude). The improving foreign manu- 
facturing return over time is also quantitatively  large, with the taxable income 
to asset ratio increasing by  .68 percentage points each year. Thus, at the be- 
ginning of the period in  1980, the foreign-domestic  differential for manufac- 
turing companies in the panel was  very large, but it declined substantially 
from 1980 to 1987. 
These exchange rate and trend effects are also clearly visible if each year in 
the panel is looked at separately. The negative differential for foreign manu- 
facturers was about 10 percentage points in 1980 and fell quite consistently 
until it was about 3.5 percentage points in  1987. Foreign wholesalers in the 
panel had apositive 6.5 percentage point differential in  1984 (the peak in the 
dollar being in early 1985) and moved to a negative differential of  about 3 
percentage points in 1987. 
How much should the exchange rate and trend effects evident in table 7.8 
change our view of  the foreign differential in  1987? First consider the ex- 
change rate. The extent to which foreign wholesalers’ 1987 profitability is 
distorted by exchange rates depends on the expected long-run exchange rate 
on which the foreign importers based their investment decisions. Surely it was 
not the extremely high value of the dollar in 1984 and early 1985. If  we use 
the average real value of the dollar from 1980 through 1989 as a more realistic 
norm, the coefficient in table 7.8 suggests that foreign wholesalers’ real return 
in  1987 was  1.6 percentage points less than the long-run average. Because 
foreign wholesalers account for  17.5 percent of  total nonfinancial foreign- 257  Low Taxable Income of Foreign-Controlled  Companies 
Table 7.8  Exchange Rate and ’Rend Effects in Taxable Income over Assets 
Regression (1980-1987 panel)* 
Independent Variable  Coefficient 
Foreign  x  Manufacturing 
Foreign  x  Wholesale 
Foreign manufacturing  x  Trend 
Foreign wholesale  X  Trend 
Foreign manufacturing  X  Exchange rate 




-  ,063 
(-1.93) 








(  ,881 
(3.25) 
-  .0249 
(-2.88) 
-  .189 
(-53.4) 
.24 
*Year, age, and basic industry dummies not displayed; r-values in parentheses. 
controlled assets, the overall 1987 foreign return would be  .28 percentage 
points higher under “normal” circumstances. In terms of our sample, foreign 
wholesalers account for 24.4 percent of the foreign observations, so the esti- 
mated foreign differential in the regressions would be  .38 percentage points 
smaller under normal circumstances. 
Let us  now  turn to the quantitative significance of  the trend effect. The 
improving profits of  foreign-controlled manufacturers in  the panel suggest 
that the 1987 differential may be distorted by the presence of recent entrants 
in the form of start-ups or acquisitions. The precise significance of  the im- 
proving profitability of  foreign manufacturing companies over time in  ex- 
plaining the overall 1987 differential is a difficult issue. A company would be 
willing to take an initial lower return if  it can expect to see its rate of return 
increase steadily in the future. But how  long can this profitability improve- 
ment be expected to continue? Also, where is the typical 1987 foreign manu- 
facturing company in its growth process? Some long-established companies 
should have returns above comparable domestic companies. 
One way we attempt to evaluate the approximate significance of the manu- 
facturing trend effect is to start with hypothetical domestic and foreign invest- 
ments and construct the different time paths of taxable income. The domestic 
company is assumed to have a constant real return of  10 percent on total as- 
sets. After deducting interest payments based on a debt-asset ratio of  .6 and a 
10 percent interest rate, its taxable income to asset ratio is .04, close to the 
mean  in the  1987 cross section. Taking the present value of  the respective 258  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
income streams, we find that investors would be indifferent between this con- 
stant return and the foreign prototype with an initial 5 percent return on total 
assets that grows by 6 percentage points per year for twenty years and is con- 
stant at that level thereafter. After interest deductions, the foreign investment 
will initially have negative taxable income. 
Next, it is necessary to match the time path of the foreign company’s tax- 
able income with the time distribution of foreign investment. The Department 
of Commerce data on acquisitions and start-ups, available since 1979, can be 
used to calculate the distribution of  1979-87  vintages. Data on the stock of 
foreign direct investment at the end of  1978 and 1987 suggest that about one- 
third of  1987 foreign-controlled assets were in foreign hands at the beginning 
of  1979. If we assume that this pre-1979 investment has a mean vintage of 
fifteen years,  we find that the average foreign taxable income to asset ratio 
was .030 in 1987, compared to .04 for domestic companies. These estimates 
do not seem very sensitive to the assumptions made. 
Another way of gauging the significance of  the manufacturing maturation 
effect is using the regression equation in table 7.8 to calculate the 1987 taxable 
income to asset ratio of foreign manufacturing companies, including the ad- 
justment for the exchange rate. That yields a domestic-foreign differential in 
1987 of -  .013, or about 1.3 percentage point less than had remained in the 
1987 cross section after the age, debt,  and intangible asset variables were 
added.  Thus, both  methods of evaluating the manufacturing trend  seem to 
yield approximately the same 1 percentage point difference. 
Manufacturing  companies  account  for 63 percent  of  total  nonfinancial 
foreign-controlled assets and for 47 percent of the companies in the 1987 cross 
section. A manufacturing return 1  .O percentage point higher would, therefore, 
reduce the domestic-foreign differential by  .5 of  .6 percentage points. 
In summary, it appears that the exchange rate and growth effects discussed 
in this section can explain about 1  .0 percentage point of the 1987 domestic- 
foreign difference in the ratio of taxable income to assets. When this is com- 
bined with the amount of the differential explained by the age, debt, and other 
variables in section 7.2, approximately one-half of the initial differential re- 
mains. 
7.4  Distribution of the Ratio of ’hxable Income to Assets-Extreme 
Losses or Concentration around Zero 
The distribution of foreign-controlled companies’ taxable income can pro- 
vide evidence on how likely it is that manipulation of income is taking place. 
Persistent large losses in relation to assets or sales would not suggest (very 
successful) tax planning, because the foreign company could lower its world- 
wide tax bill by  shifting some of  its losses to other jurisdictions. If  foreign 
companies’ low average profitability were due to a relatively small number 
with extreme losses while the remainder resembled domestically controlled 259  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled  Companies 
companies, it would be difficult to claim that foreign companies are engaging 
in widespread income shifting. 
On the other hand, what distribution would  be consistent with earnings 
shifting? First, the value of shifting large profits to low-tax locations and the 
value of  shifting large losses to other high-tax locations would lead one to 
expect a concentration of companies around zero taxable income (in relation 
to assets). If  shifting were costless, all companies would be at exactly zero 
taxable income at all times. In the general case, bookkeeping costs, potential 
penalties, and legal scruples prevent perfect shifting, but a concentration near 
zero would still be the expected pattern. In particular, if there is widespread 
income shifting, there would be a large disparity at the very high profitability 
part of the distribution. Companies with intrinsic high profitability could shift 
substantial profits from the United States and still leave income large enough 
not to attract the suspicion of  tax auditors. It is presumably difficult for tax 
administrators to attack “normal” or average profitability levels.  l2 
7.4.1  Description of the Distribution 
Table 7.9 shows the 1987 distribution of the ratio of taxable income to total 
assets for foreign-controlled and domestic companies. The three components 
of  table 7.9 apply, respectively, to all  nonfinancial companies in  the  1987 
cross section, all wholesaling and manufacturing companies, and all nonfi- 
nancial companies with assets in excess of $250 million. In each case, data in 
the table reveal a very clear concentration of foreign companies around zero. 
For the most comprehensive group in the first two columns of the table (dis- 
played in  figure 7.1), about 37 percent of  the foreign companies are in the 
interval from -  .025 to + .025. In contrast, the domestic distribution not only 
has a higher mean but is much flatter in the central range. Furthermore, the 
frequency of very profitable companies, with r, in excess of  .20, is three times 
greater for domestic companies than for foreign ones. In contrast, the differ- 
ence in the frequency of extreme losses is not very large, with 3.4 percent of 
the foreign companies versus 2.0 percent of the domestic ones having r, less 
than -  .15. 
If  anything, the remaining columns of  table 7.9 strengthen this picture of 
foreign taxable income concentrated around zero. In the case of manufactur- 
ing and wholesaling companies (which account for more than 70 percent of 
the  foreign observations), the foreign distribution remains about the same 
while the domestic distribution is flatter. The discrepancy in the high profit- 
ability range is even greater. In the last two columns, which restrict the anal- 
ysis to only the companies with total assets in excess of  $250 million, the 
concentration of foreign companies around zero is even more evident, with 
12. Shifting large profits out of the United States may be easier than eliminating losses. In  the 
latter case, the company may already have worldwide losses. The incentive to shift losses may be 
reduced because of  their value  as carryforwards or carrybacks. It may also be easier to justify 
charges for services by the parent of the affiliate than the reverse. 260  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
Table 7.9  Distribution of Taxable Income over Assets for Foreign and Domestic 
Companies (1987 cross section) 
All  Manufacturing  All 
Nonfinancial  and  Nonfinancial > 
Companies  Wholesale Only  $250 Million 
Taxable 
IncomdAssets  Foreign  Domestic  Foreign  Domestic  Foreign  Domestic 
~~ 
5 -.I5 
> -0.15  to -.I0 
> -.loto  -.075 
> -  ,075 to -  .05 
> -.05 to  -.025 
> -  ,025 to 0 
> 0 to ,025 
> ,025 to .05 
> .05 to ,075 
> .075 to .10 
> .10 to .I5 
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more than 45 percent in the -  .025 to  +  .025 interval, and the frequency of 
foreign and domestic companies with extreme losses is virtually identical.  I3 
The more concentrated nature of  the foreign distribution is confirmed by 
statistical tests. For companies with assets in excess of $250 million, the stan- 
dard deviation of foreign-controlled companies’ taxable income to asset ratio 
is .070, compared to .095 for domestic companies. Given the number of com- 
panies in each group (223 and 1,383), the difference is highly significant using 
a standard F-test. When various nonparametric tests for the difference in two 
distributions are applied, such as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the scores are 
always highly significant. 
Is the concentration of foreign-controlled companies around zero taxable 
income a fortuitous outcome in a single year, 1987, or is it apparent in other 
years as well? The 1980-87  panel can be used to answer this question. The 
left part of table 7.10 gives the distribution of r, in the panel with each year 
counting as a separate observation. (Broader income categories are used be- 
cause of the relative sparseness of the companies in the panel). The concentra- 
tion of foreign companies around zero is virtually identical to the 1987 cross 
section,  which  is  remarkable  in  view  of  the  large  changes  in  tax  laws 
and economic conditions over this period. As would be expected, averaging 
over the eight years concentrates both foreign and domestic companies around 
their means, but the difference in the distributions seems, if  anything, more 
striking. 
7.4.2  Persistence near Zero 
If a significant number of foreign companies make an effort to remain close 
to zero taxable income, their behavior over time can also be expected to differ 
from domestic companies. They would be more likely to persist in the area 
around zero.  Also, foreign companies finding themselves above the region 
near zero might be expected to reduce their taxable income in succeeding 
periods. 
Table 7.11 shows that this behavior over time that would be consistent with 
income management seems to take place. The table gives the probit results for 
the probability that a company will be in a given profit interval given its posi- 
tion in the previous year, after controlling for industry, age, and year effects. 
The lagged profit range dummies are interacted with the foreign dummy to see 
if foreign-controlled companies behave differently from domestic ones. 
Of particular interest are firms whose returns center around zero. The third 
column of table 7.1  1 gives the coefficients for the probability of being in the 
-  .025  to  .025  interval.  The coefficient of  the  interaction of  the foreign 
dummy with the variable indicating presence in the central interval in the pre- 
vious year is positive, large, and highly significant. In other words, foreign 
13. In the less than -  .15 category, average foreign profitability exceeds domestic profitability. 
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Table 7.10  Taxable Income Distribution from 1980-87 Panel 
Each Year as a  Average from 
Single Observation  1980 to 1987 
Taxable Income/ 
Assets Ratio  Foreign  Domestic  Foreign  Domestic 
5 -.075  ,104  ,052  ,068  .048 
> -  ,075 to -  ,025  ,157  ,075  ,068  .05  1 
> -  .025 to  + ,025  .375  ,242  .475  .249 
> -  .025 to ,075  ,149  .270  ,112  ,336 
> .075 to .I5  ,115  .208  ,103  .202 
> .I5  ,101  ,152  ,075  .114 
Table 7.11  Probit Results for Probability of Being in a Given Income-Assets  Interval 
(1980-1987  Panel)* 
Prob.  Prob.  Prob.  Prob. 
Position in  Prob .  > -.075  > -.025  > ,025  > ,075  Prob. 
Previous Year  5 -.075  to  -.025  to ,025  to .075  to .15  > .I5 
> -  .075 to -  ,025  -  ,586 
(-7.41) 
-  1.472 
(- 19.60) 
-  1.872 
> -  ,025 to .025 
> ,025 to .075 
(21.77) 
-  1.941 
( -20.64) 
> .I5  -  2.124 
(18.21) 
> ,075 to .I5 
5 -.075  X  -  ,032 
Foreign  (- .21) 
x  Foreign  (- .93) 
Foreign  (.22) 
> -  ,075 to -  ,025  -  .I32 
> -  ,025 to ,025 X  -  .031 
> ,025 to .075 X  ,534 
Foreign  (2.62) 
> ,075 to .I5 X  .325 
Foreign  (1.25) 
> .I5 x  Foreign  ,105 
( .  26) 
,061 
(.75) 
-  ,442 
(-6.31) 
-  ,918 
( -  1  1.92) 
-  1.231 
(- 13.99) 




















-  ,587 
(-7.62) 
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(1  1.58) 
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(-2.71) 
-  .262 
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(- 2.03) 
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*Industry, year, and age dummies not displayed; t-ratios in parentheses. 
companies are much more likely to persist in the -  .025 to .025 area. Further- 
more, the fourth column, giving the probability of  being in the interval just 
above (.025  to .075), indicates that foreign companies are much less likely to 
persist there than domestic companies. (They are also less likely to move into 
this interval from the central region.) some of the foreign-controlled compa- 263  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled  Companies 
nies leaving the .025 to .075 interval move up, but more move to lower prof- 
itability levels, including the central area. Particularly notable is the fact, as 
shown in column 1, that foreign companies in  the .025 to .075  interval are 
much more likely to move down to the lowest profitability category, below 
-  .075, than domestic companies. 
The probit coefficients can be used to illustrate the quantitative difference 
between foreign and domestic firms. For example, the probability that a man- 
ufacturing company in  1987 with  a date of  incorporation five to ten years 
earlier will persist in the -  .025 to .025 range is .  10 (or 22 percent) greater if 
it is foreign. If the company had been in the .025 to .075 interval, the proba- 
bility of its remaining there is .19 (or 38 percent) lower if it is foreign. 
The first and sixth columns of table 7.1 1 indicate that foreign and domestic 
companies are about equally likely to persist at the extremes of  profitability, 
below -  .075 and  above .15. Foreign companies are much more likely to 
persist in the -  .075  to -  .025 interval, which generally seems a relatively 
temporary state for all companies. 
7.4.3  Relationship to Previous Results 
It appears appropriate at this point to attempt to integrate the results in this 
section with the earlier ones, or at least to resolve any apparent contradictions. 
For example, the previous section indicated that exchange rates were signifi- 
cant in explaining the profitability of foreign wholesalers. Foreign manufac- 
turers were shown to have rising profitability over time. Are the persistence 
results in table 7.11 affected by the inclusion of these exchange rate and trend 
variables? The major conclusions are not  altered. The strong persistence of 
foreign companies near zero remains, and the exchange rate and trend vari- 
ables are insignificant for this central state. Similarly, the nonpersistence of 
foreign companies in the interval just above zero is also essentially unaffected, 
but the trend is almost significant in causing foreign manufacturing companies 
to be more likely to be in this state. Furthermore, the exchange rate and trend 
variables, for wholesalers and manufacturers, respectively, are also significant 
in some of the probits for the other states. For example, the exchange rate is 
significant in reducing the probability that foreign wholesalers will be in the 
lowest profitability interval. Also, the trend significantly increases the proba- 
bility that foreign manufacturers will be in the interval from .075 to .15. 
Is the distribution of  profitability distorted by  the asset revaluation effects 
discussed in section 7.2? One way of judging this is by  looking only at com- 
panies incorporated in the past five years. Although the mean return for do- 
mestic companies decreases, the large difference between the foreign and do- 
mestic distributions is still notable. The foreign distribution remains much 
more concentrated in the -  .025 and .025 interval. The foreign and domestic 
distributions are very similar at the low end up to -  .025, when the foreign 
distribution jumps up sharply and then falls rapidly above .025. In contrast, 
the domestic distribution is much flatter in the region above -  .025. Our in- 264  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
terpreting  the  difference in  distributions as  suggesting income  shifting is 
therefore not contradicted by the earlier results. 
It may also be of interest to see how the results in section 7.2 are affected if 
the 1987 cross section is limited only to companies with positive taxable in- 
come. Some might argue that companies that show losses must actually be 
losing money, because they do not have any incentive to reduce taxable in- 
come below zero. (Because of  loss carryovers and prospective audits, this is 
not strictly correct.) When only companies with positive income are included, 
the foreign differential reported in section 7.2 remains significant but is some- 
what reduced in magnitude. For example, the 2.59 percent differential for r, 
in the last column of table 7.2 becomes 1.96 percent with a t-value of almost 
four. The differential in sales margins is reduced somewhat more but remains 
highly significant. (The r, and the operating income to sales margin differen- 
tials,  in fact, become virtually identical.) The significance of  some of  the 
other variables changes. For example, the age dummies are much smaller and 
largely insignificant in the rf  regression, while purchases become much more 
significant in the sales margins regressions. 
To  summarize this  section,  both  the  distribution of  rf in  1987 and  its 
changes over time revealed by the 1980-87  panel are consistent with the pat- 
tern expected if  income shifting by  foreign companies is prevalent. Foreign 
companies tend to concentrate near a zero ratio of  taxable income to assets 
and persist there. The low average taxable income of foreign-controlled com- 
panies does not seem to be attributable to any large extent to the greater fre- 
quency of extreme losses. On the other hand, there is a very large domestic- 
foreign discrepancy in the frequency of highly profitable companies. 
7.5  Alfiliate Taxable Income and the Characteristics of the 
Parent Company 
Financial information on the foreign parent company may provide insight 
on the financial incentives of the affiliate as well as on its ability to manipulate 
income. For example, if the affiliate is small relative to the parent, it may be 
more likely that the afiliate is able to incur losses for a long time before be- 
coming successful. The small relative size of  the affiliate may also indicate 
that it is at an early stage in its growth process. Other aspects of the parent’s 
activities may also be relevant. Information on the parent’s U.S. acquisition 
activity would indicate whether the subsidiary is more likely to have been a 
start-up rather than the result of an acquisition. In addition, the presence of an 
affiliate in a tax haven may enhance the parent’s ability to shift income from 
the U.S. to low-tax jurisdictions. 
The relationship between the parent’s (book) income and the affiliate’s tax- 
able income is also of  interest. Admittedly, taxable income and book income 
may differ substantially. Furthermore, accounting standards vary across coun- 
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dated” financial reports. Still, common products and management would lead 
one to expect a positive correlation between parent and subsidiary profitabil- 
ity. Further, this correlation could increase as the affiliate becomes large rela- 
tive to the parent, for two reasons: first, the affiliate becomes a larger compo- 
nent of the parent’s worldwide profit; second, it is more likely to be included 
in the parent’s consolidated financial reports. 
To investigate these issues, we linked a subsample of the foreign-controlled 
companies in the 1987 cross section with financial information on their con- 
trolling parent. Who Owns  Whom and the International Directory of  Corpo- 
rate Afiliations were used  to identify the owners of  the corporations filing 
U.S. tax returns. On this basis, approximately 400 parent firms were identi- 
fied. The sample size was reduced to 291 because some did not have financial 
information listed in Moody’s International. 
Table 7.12 gives regression results for the U.S.  subsidiaries’ taxable in- 
come to asset ratio when variables based on the parent’s characteristics are 
included as explanatory variables. The size variable is the ratio of the affili- 
ate’s total sales to the parent’s. The haven variable is a dummy set equal to one 
if Moody’s lists a subsidiary in a tax haven. The acquisition data are derived 
from Mergers and Acquisitions magazine and include acquisitions by the par- 
ent from 1974 through 1987. (These acquisition data are described more fully 
in section 7.6.) The acquisitions variable is the ratio of the reported total value 
of acquisitions by  the parent to the total assets of the subsidiary. Profit rate is 
the ratio of the parent’s pretax net income to its total assets. The profit-size 
variable is the interaction of the parent profit rate with the size variable. 
The only new variables that are consistently significant are the ones based 
on the parent’s profit rate. In the first column of table 7.12, the parent’s profit 
rate has a significant positive coefficient. But when the profit rate to size vari- 
able is introduced in the second regression, the simple profit rate is no longer 
significant. As expected, the affiliate’s profitability is more closely related to 
the parent’s when the affiliate accounts for a large share of the parent’s world- 
wide operation. The coefficient for the profit-size variable tends to be close to 
one. Furthermore, when the leverage ratio is not included as a variable, the 
constant term in the regressions is small and not very significant. Thus, it 
appears that when the affiliate is so large that it virtually represents the parent’s 
entire worldwide operation, the affiliate’s taxable income to asset ratio tends 
to approximate the parent’s profit rate. But it is also necessary to consider the 
negative coefficient on the relative size variable. A negative coefficient would 
be  expected in  this case because there must be  an  offset to the increasing 
weight of the parent’s profit rate as the affiliate’s size increases relative to the 
parent.I4 But the negative coefficient is much larger than expected. Accord- 
ingly, the coefficients indicate that if the affiliate constitutes the parent’s entire 
14. In other words, the relationship is of the form rA = rp.S + (1 -  S)r, where rA  is the affil- 
iate profit rate, rp  is the parent’s, S is relative size, and r is some average &hate  profitability. 266  H. Grubert, T. Goodspeed, and D. Swenson 
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*Age and industry dummies not displayed; t = values in parentheses. 
operation, its profitability only approximates the parent’s when the parent is 
highly profitable. Also, as indicated by  the  .25 coefficient for the parent’s 
profit rate in  the first column, the relationship between parent and affiliate 
profitability seems in general much weaker. 
Turning to the other independent variables in table 7.12, the affiliate’s size 
relative to the parent is of  borderline significance and positive in column 1, 
when the sign is not affected by the presence of the size to profit rate variable. 
The positive sign is consistent with some type of start-up effect. (The parent’s 
absolute size is never close to being significant, which casts doubt on any cost 
of  capital or long horizon interpretation.) The value-of-acquisitions variable 
is sometimes close to being significant, although the coefficient is positive and 
not easy to interpret. It may suggest that acquisitions are more profitable than 
start-ups or that they become profitable more quickly than start-ups. Finally, 
the tax haven coefficient is virtually zero in all specifications. This may reflect 
a problem in methodology alluded to in earlier sections. It is possible that only 
the most profitable firms incur the costs of establishing tax haven affiliates, if 
the presence of supernormal profits is required to justify the haven expendi- 
ture. If  these highly profitable foreign firms shifted income until their profit 
rates  were identical with less profitable foreign subsidiaries in  the United 
States, no effect would be noted on the tax haven variable, even though the 
haven was responsible for the subsidiaries’ reduction in U.S. taxable income. 
Even though accounting rules are not standardized across countries, it is of 
interest to compare the profitability of foreign parents with similar companies 
based in  the United States. Using the data from Moody’s International,  we 
find that the average parent’s pretax profit rate is 8.49 percent (and 4.99 after 
provision for tax). This compares with 5.97 percent pretax for the average 267  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled  Companies 
U.S. nonfinancial company in the  1987 Compustat. To  the extent that U.S. 
and foreign accounting data are comparable, foreign parents seem on the av- 
erage to be more profitable than the average U.S. company. This superior 
profitability does not suggest a lower required return on capital, although the 
role of the cost of capital is clouded by  the fact that we would expect multi- 
national companies to have better economic prospects. 
Further, even in view of  the difference between the taxable and book in- 
come concepts, the discrepancy appears very large between the parents’ aver- 
age 8.49 pretax profit rate and the 2.28 percent taxable income rate reported 
on  the average by  their subsidiaries. In contrast, the average 5.97 percent 
profit rate for domestic nonfinancial companies in Compustat is only modestly 
greater than the 4.07 percent taxable income rate in the 1987 sample. Among 
major investing countries, the largest discrepancy between parent and afFiliate 
profitability is in companies from the United Kingdom. Affiliates from Japan 
had  low relative returns before adjusting for leverage, but their parents also 
were relatively unprofitable compared to parents from other countries; the 
discrepancy between parent and  affiliate returns was  therefore close to the 
average. 
7.6  Profitability of Companies prior to Foreign Ownership 
Acquisition of  U.S. assets has prevailed as the primary means of  foreign 
entry into U.S. business. Foreign activity in  1987 proved no exception. Ac- 
cording to Commerce Department data, new foreign operations in 1987 com- 
prised 543 acquisitions and 435 establishments. Despite the approximate nu- 
merical  equality  of  these  two  methods,  acquisitions accounted  for  84.2 
percent of the $40.4 billion spent on foreign entry into the United States. In 
light of the prominence of foreign merger activity, it seems important to see 
whether characteristics of the acquired firms themselves are responsible for 
the relatively low foreign earnings. 
To assess the possibility that the low profitability of foreign-controlled com- 
panies is caused by the low profitability of the U.S. targets they acquired, we 
turn to a sample of 118 foreign acquisitions that were completed between the 
years 1980 and 1987.15  The regressions in table 7.13 involve not only those 
U.S. firms that were subject to foreign takeover but also U.S. firms from the 
Compustat industrial file. In order to replicate the general regression form 
presented in earlier sections of this paper, we use the ratio of book income to 
total assets as the dependent variable in the first two columns of  table 7.13. 
The foreign target dummy is set at a value of  one for U.S. companies in the 
year prior to being acquired by a foreign owner. The results indicate that for- 
15. This sample of foreign mergers is a subset of those analyzed in an event study by Swenson 
(1991). The larger sample includes all foreign acquisitions that occurred between 1974 and 1987 
and were listed in the quarterly rosters of the publication Mergers and Acquisirions as well as 
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Table 7.13  Profitability and Growth of U.S. Companies prior to Foreign 
Ownership* 
Dependent Variable 
Book  Book  4-Year  4-Year 
Income/  Income/  Sales  Asset 
Assets  Assets  Growth  Growth 
Constant  .050  ,050  0.402  0.485 
(1  9.69)  (16.57)  (20.25)  (24.54) 
Foreign target dummy  -  .0033  -  .0040  0.25  0.071 
(yes = 1)  (-0.48)  (-0.70)  (0.37)  (1.45) 
Food  ,0066 
(1.67) 
Chemical  .0050 
(1.58) 
Electronics  ,005 
(0.130) 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R’  adjusted  0.007  0.012  0.010  0.018 
*t-values in parentheses. 
eign targets were, on average, less profitable than comparable U.S. companies 
but that the difference is small and not statistically significant. Hence, the low 
profitability of foreign-controlled companies does not seem to be attributable 
to  the  low  quality of  the assets acquired. The second regression includes 
dummy variables for each year, as well as for selected industries. Once again, 
there is no indication that foreign firms purchase abnormally low profit firms. 
The fact that foreign-controlled companies have a very low ratio of taxable 
income to sales even though they earned normal profits prior to being acquired 
suggests several possibilities. Foreign owners may have made large invest- 
ments after acquiring their U. s.  companies, which depresses their earnings in 
the initial years of operation, or foreign firms may have been willing to take 
lower profits in the short run while operations were modified. Alternatively, 
the low profitability subsequent to takeover may arise from the diversion of 
profits to foreign locations. 
Rates of  return are not the only dimension on which the performance of 
targets of foreign acquisition may deviate from the performance of domestic 
companies. As indicators of differences in the time path of firm activity, col- 
umns 3 and 4 of table 7.13 consider the four-year growth rates of  sales and 
assets. Again the sample includes industrial firms from the Compustat files, 
and the foreign target dummy variable indicates those U.S. firms that become 
the target of a foreign acquisition in the subsequent year. The results show that 
prior to their acquisition, foreign targets were growing somewhat faster than 
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coefficient is of borderline statistical significance. This is consistent with the 
finding in Swenson (1991) that foreign targets tended to have higher price- 
earnings ratios than did the targets of domestic acquisition, as this is an indi- 
cator that future earnings are expected to grow. 
This evidence on the growth of firms targeted for foreign acquisition may 
give some confirmation to the trend effect described in section 7.3. But the 
trend  or maturation effect may  reflect other factors as well.  As  suggested 
above, foreign owners may, after they acquire a company, make large initial 
investments in order to better utilize the assets.  In addition, the  1980-87 
cross-section data involve foreign operations that started prior to 1980. To the 
extent that foreign investment activity before 1980 may have involved a larger 
share of  start-ups than  was true in the  1980s, the acquisition data will not 
provide a complete picture. 
7.7  Summary and  Conclusions 
Aggregate  statistics  indicate  that  foreign-controlled  companies  in  the 
United States report strikingly less taxable income than do their domestically 
controlled counterparts. Although many possible explanations have been pro- 
posed, their validity has not been established in previous work. We  have ex- 
amined firm-level data to evaluate the relative merit of these explanations. 
Of the initial foreign-domestic differential, we find that about 50 percent is 
definitely attributable to the special characteristics of foreign-controlled com- 
panies and not to transfer pricing. First, the revaluation of the book value of 
assets following acquisitions can distort the comparison of the ratio of taxable 
income to assets. Second, a maturation process is indicated by the fact that 
profitability of  foreign-controlled manufacturing companies rises over time 
relative to comparable domestically controlled firms. Foreign investors may, 
therefore, accept lower initial returns in exchange for high long-run profits. 
Third, the taxable income of foreign-controlled wholesale companies relative 
to their domestically controlled counterparts is found to rise as the real value 
of the dollar increases relative to other currencies. In particular, the large drop 
in the dollar since 1985 has depressed recent returns of  foreign investors in 
wholesaling. 
Other commonly suggested reasons for the foreign-domestic differential 
have less explanatory power. First, we find that debt and earnings stripping do 
not  appear  to  be  major  reasons  for  the  low  taxable  income  of  foreign- 
controlled companies.  In general, the debt-asset ratio of  foreign-controlled 
companies is not notably different from that of domestically controlled com- 
panies,  and their interest expense for a given level of  debt is significantly 
lower. Although foreign-controlled companies have an  apparent preference 
for operations with rising profit profiles, there is not much evidence that any 
advantage in the cost of equity capital explains the foreign income differential. 
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important. Furthermore, foreign parents seem in general to be more profitable 
than the typical U.S. company.'6 Additionally, we find that the evidence does 
not support the hypothesis that foreign firms tend to acquire relatively unprof- 
itable firms. Low profitability is a characteristic of foreign-controlled compa- 
nies irrespective of their country or origin. It is not restricted to companies 
based in only a few countries or operating in a narrow range of industries. 
The distribution of foreign rates of return between 1980  and 1987, however, 
does provide indirect evidence that income shifting is partially responsible for 
the low rate of return of foreign firms. Not only were foreign firms heavily 
concentrated around a zero rate of return but they also tended to persist in the 
zero region, and they were more likely to transit back to the zero region from 
a higher profit range. This phenomenon seems remarkable when placed in the 
context of  ongoing tax reforms, economic cycles, and large exchange rate 
fluctuations and seems indicative of foreign company efforts to reduce U.S. 
taxable income through earnings manipulation. While the degree of  transfer 
pricing distortions is perhaps smaller than might be feared, income shifting 
seems to be  at least partially responsible for the remaining gap in taxable 
income. 
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Comment  Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
Foreign-controlled  corporations report lower taxable profit rates than do U.S .- 
controlled corporations. To no one's surprise, there has been suspicion that 
16. The unexplained differential in the ratio of taxable income to assets is almost 2 percentage 
points. In view of debt-asset ratios of about two-thirds, this would imply that the cost of equity 
capital would have to be more than 7 percentage points lower for foreign companies to explain the 
remaining differential.  An equity cost of capital advantage of anything resembling this magnitude 
seems highly implausible. 
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason is associate professor of economics and public policy at the Univer- 
sity of Michigan and a faculty research fellow of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 271  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled Companies 
foreign corporations are hiding their profits and not paying their “fair share” 
of  taxes. Of  course,  it may be true that foreign-controlled corporations are 
simply less profitable. Before this .paper by  Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swen- 
son, there was precious little evidence to help us  distinguish between these 
(and other) explanations for the well-known difference in profit rates. 
What we  learn from this paper is that almost every plausible hypothesis 
finds some support in the data as a partial explanation for the profit rate differ- 
ence. There is not one simple, dominant story. On the central hypothesis- 
that the profits are being hidden, presumably through transfer pricing-the 
authors suggest that as much as 50 percent of the difference in reported profits 
may be due to transfer pricing. 
On the other hand, it may be that none of the profit rate difference is due to 
transfer pricing. The authors provide no direct evidence either way. Their re- 
search design is to use the “residual method.” They attempt to explain the 
puzzle with every story they can, and then, as they write in their introduction, 
“This still leaves us with a significant difference that we are unable to explain 
by forces other than transfer pricing.” 
The extent to which we can believe the importance of  transfer pricing de- 
pends on how convinced we  are that (1) a complete list of alternatives was 
considered and (2)  the full extent of  the alternative effects was measured. I 
find myself convinced that they have done a fine job in identifying many dif- 
ferent effects, but there are some plausible effects left untested. Further, sev- 
eral of  the  stories they do consider are measured with low-power, indirect 
tests.  Thus,  I am not  very  confident in the magnitude of  the residual nor 
whether the extent of  transfer pricing is cause for more policy effort than is 
already under way. 
I do not think that it was a mistake for the authors to use the residual method 
for investigating the importance of  transfer pricing. Indeed, they have little 
choice. By their nature, transfer pricing activities are guarded as private infor- 
mation. Direct measurement is not feasible. This paper represents a careful 
and thoughtful effort to learn what we can from available data, and we learn 
much from it. We  must be cautious, however, about drawing stronger infer- 
ences than the residual method can support. 
Even if we do not learn the final word on transfer pricing, there is much to 
be learned on the importance of  the other stories. For the remainder of  my 
comments, I will focus on the measurements the authors do undertake rather 
than on those they do not. 
First, since the paper considers so many explanations, I think it would be 
helpful to organize them. Each of the stories in the paper falls into one of four 
categories: 
1.  “True”  economic  profits  are  different  for  foreign-  and  domestic- 
controlled firms, because there is some incentive for foreigners to own low- 
profit firms. 
2. Ex ante, expected true profits are the same, but shocks lead to different 
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3. True profits are the same, but some accounting rule difference or anom- 
4.  True profits are the same, but foreign owners arrange to report lower 
aly in the data leads to different reported profits. 
profits through transfer pricing and other income-shifting techniques. 
I.  Foreigners own lower-proJit  Jirms. Foreign investors might systematically 
own lower-profit firms if, for example, they face a lower real cost of capital. 
The authors test this point only indirectly, by  assuming that being a capital 
exporter proxies for a low cost of capital. Entering the ratio of current account 
surplus to gross domestic product as an explanatory variable has no explana- 
tory power in  the profit rate regressions, but that is not  a very convincing 
rejection of the possibility of capital cost differences. 
The authors note that a disproportionate number of foreign-controlled firms 
are recent acquisitions. They do not provide an equilibrium explanation for 
this' but observe that the different ownership composition could bias foreign 
firms toward low reported profit rates. In particular, a step-up in asset basis 
upon acquisition would increase the denominator of a profit-assets ratio.* In- 
deed, the profit rate differential drops from about 3.6 percent to 2.6 percent 
when age-of-incorporation dummies are introduced. This result seems quite 
strong and important. 
The apparently important differences between the types of  firms that are 
foreign- and domestic-controlled suggest that carrying the analysis one step 
further would be useful. The authors use age of incorporation as a proxy for 
acquisitions (and possibly other sources of  real profit differences), but it is 
possible to identify actual acquisitions by  year, using, for example, the data 
in Mergerstat. If  the authors did that, they could really sharpen the test of 
acquisition effects by changing the control group, comparing foreign-acquired 
firms to only domestic-acquired firms rather than to all domestic-controlled 
firms. That would help us determine whether the profit rate difference is due 
to the fact that the firm was acquired or to the fact that foreigners own the 
firm. 
2. Expected projits the same, but foreigners had bad stochastic realizations. 
The analysis in the first half of the paper is based on a cross section of reported 
profit rates in one year (1987). Was that just a bad year for foreign owners? 
The authors use a 1980-87  panel to investigate the possibility that exchange 
rate movements are the culprit. Exchange rates seem important for wholesal- 
ers, but the authors do a good job of showing that this effect has a rather small 
1. Tax policy seems to provide some incentive for a higher rate of foreign acquisitions, espe- 
cially in recent years. See Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1991) and Scholes and Wolfson (1988). 
2. No typology is perfect: the step-up in basis is really an accounting artifact, or one of my type 
2 stones. But it also seems plausible to think that for other reasons the true profit rate of recently 
acquired firms may differ from stable, mature firms. 273  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled  Companies 
effect on the aggregate profit rate difference. Of  course, a number of  other 
possible sources of unexpectedly bad foreign performance are not tested, such 
as changes in trade and tax policies. 
3. Accounting  rule artifacts. With one exception, the authors do not discuss 
the possibility that the profit rate gap is due simply to differences in reporting 
rules. (The exception is the step-up in  basis upon acquisition, as discussed 
above.) Perhaps it is obvious that the reporting rules are blind to location of 
ownership. Even if there were a smoking gun, I am not conversant enough in 
international tax reporting rules to identify it. One thing I have learned, how- 
ever, is that the U.S. rules for multinationals are sufficiently complex that I 
would believe almost anything. If  there is a simple reason why the data cannot 
be explained by accounting rule differences, I would have liked the authors to 
at least briefly educate the rest of us. 
4.  True profits are the same, but foreignjirms do more income shifting to avoid 
US.  taxes. Although the authors have no direct tests that reveal income shift- 
ing, they do provide some intriguing evidence to support interpreting the re- 
sidual as due in part to shifting. They hypothesize that if  foreign firms were 
more aggressively managing their taxable income, we  should expect to see 
their profit rates concentrated around zero. Indeed, this appears to be the case. 
Unfortunately, the authors choose to present the results with graphs and tables 
and eschew presentation of any nonparametric tests of the hypothesized differ- 
ences between  the distributions of  foreign- and  domestic-controlled profit 
rates, making it difficult to be sure how convincing the differences are. The 
weight of the evidence clearly is consistent with the presence of some income 
shifting, however. 
The authors test a number of other, mostly lesser explanations that fall into 
the above four categories. Their exposition of the results is clear and interest- 
ing and does not need repeating by  me. Instead, I would like to close with 
three concrete suggestions that I think would increase the overall effectiveness 
of the paper. 
First, I would find it quite helpful to have a better sense of the target of 
analysis. The paper is motivated by  table 7.1, which shows a difference in 
profit rates. Since the authors have income statements and balance sheets, it 
would be a simple matter to provide a decomposition of the profit differences 
into revenue and cost elements. Suppose we  found that the difference was 
mostly due to differences in depreciation deductions but not in revenues? Or 
perhaps that the assets denominator was the culprit, largely due to differences 
in intangibles rather than in plant and equipment? We  could then design tests 
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temative explanations would likely be stimulated. Simply saying that profit 
rates are different is too vague. 
Second, I think we might learn quite a bit from attention to a different con- 
trol sample. Nearly all of the foreign-owned firms are presumably parts of 
multinationals. Comparing these firms against only domestic-controlled mul- 
tinationals (rather than all domestic firms) would focus the investigation of the 
sources of profit differences. Just as with my proposal to compare foreign and 
domestic acquired firms, we could learn about the extent to which it is  foreign 
firms that are different, versus multinational firms. 
Last,  the  authors  could  have  learned  more  from  another  nice,  near- 
experiment available in their data. They investigate the phenomenon of low- 
profit foreign-acquired firms by studying the profits of the target firms before 
acquisition. In these analyses, in the last part of the paper, they compare for- 
eign acquisition targets to all U.S. corporations and discuss a number of rea- 
sons that might explain their finding that targets have insignificantly different 
profits before but significantly lower profits after the acquisition. The much 
more  informative  and  relatively  clean  analysis would  be  to  compare the 
before-and-after profitability of foreign targets that were later acquired by do- 
mestic firms. Even a simple two-way analysis of the following sort could be 
revealing: 
Profit Rate 
U.S.  acquirer  I  I 
Foreign acquirer  1  I 
Does the profit rate fall after acquisition, regardless of the acquirer’s loca- 
tion? Is the decrease larger for foreign acquisitions? The same simple calcu- 
lations could be done with a further restriction of the U.S. acquirer group to 
multinationals, an even more closely comparable control group. 
This is a long paper but very rich with informative analysis. At the end, 
however, we are still left without a strong sense of the importance of transfer 
pricing. And there is still much that can be learned about the causes of profit 
rate  differences from the data the authors have collected. Nonetheless, my 
critical remarks should not obscure the fact that this paper provides a number 
of  new  and interesting results,  and we  now  know  much  more than before 
about the profit rate differences between foreign- and domestic-controlled cor- 
porations. 
3. In response to my earlier comments, the authors did include a paragraph reporting that their 
main results continue to hold when the control group is restricted to domestic MNCs; I am glad to 
see that. However, they do not go beyond affirming their initial analysis. They could take advan- 
tage of this natural control group to improve our understanding of  the sources of profit rate differ- 
ences. 275  Low Taxable Income of  Foreign-Controlled Companies 
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